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In a recent article Barry Stroud has reminded us that a traditional 
and crucial issue in epistemology is represented by ttthe possibility 
that the world is completely different in general from the way our 
sensory impacts and our internal makeup lead us to think oP.1 In 
order to give some initial credence to such a doubt, we need to give 
some credence to three hypotheses: first, that there is something 
like an independent external reality; second, that the epistemic re- 
lationship occurring between this reality and the knowing subject is 
somehow such as to not allow the latter to know the intrinsic nature 
of the former; and finally, that the human knower has a spontaneous 
desire to know what the intrinsic nature of external reality is. It is 
only the last condition which makes it possible to consider the state 
of affairs described by the former two as problematic. 
Solutions of what I shall call henceforth the sceptical Traumatic 
Doubt have been attempted by approaching it either from the on- 
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tologjcal or from the epistcmical side. In what follows, it is my in- 
tention to argue that, if the doubt is understood in Kantian terms, 
as pointing to the gulf that may exist between phenomena and 
noumena, a re-interpretation of the "anthropological component" 
can also represent a successful strategy. The hypothesis I shall ad- 
vocate relies on three presuppositions. The desire for knowledge for 
its own sake is in fact a conditio sine qua non for the Traumatic 
Doubt. By eliminating the assumption of such a desire, the inca- 
pacity or impossibility to grasp the intrinsic nature of external reality 
no longer appears as a failure. And finally, the desire for knowledge 
can indeed be replaced by a better explanation of the genesis of the 
search for knowledge. Philosophers commonly refer to the desire 
to know as if it were the necessary and sufficient reason why, at a 
certain stage, the human subject activates his cognitive processes in 
order to know external reality. Peirce has conjectured a different 
explanation, and I shall argue that a Peirceislfi interpretation of the 
genesis of the search for knowledge can provide a winning strategy 
with respect to the sceptical problem. 
II. "All men by nature desire to know" 
Aristotle provided the most influential nswer to the question 
"what is the origin of man's search for knowledge?" in the famous 
incipit of the Metaphysics-, "all men by nature (phusei) desire (ore- 
¿fontai) to know [eidenai] M .3 Although he acknowledged that man's 
search for knowledge is to escape from his nescience^ he maintained 
that the state of wonder and puzzlement that man feels with respect 
to its absence is a mere secondary effect due to the lack of some- 
thing not yet possessed, what we might call nowadays a background 
condition. No matter how urgent this negative uneasiness may be, 
the principal reason why man searches for knowledge is his natural 
and original impulse to achieve the full actualization of his intel- 
lectual potentiality in the state of perfect knowledge.5 
In more elitist and mythological terms, Plato6 had already en- 
dorsed a similar position,7 the main difference being that in the 
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absence of a metaphysics of potentiality, he had been forced to 
accentuate the hypostatization of the desire to know.8 Probably for 
the same reason, he had also tended to stress, more than Aristotle, 
the strict connection between desire and feeling of want. As he says: 
"no god is a philosopher or a seeker after wisdom, for he is wise 
already; nor does any man who is wise seek after wisdom. Neither 
do the ignorant seek after wisdom; for herein is the evil of ignor- 
ance, that he who is neither a man of honour nor wise is never- 
theless atisfied with himself: there is no desire when there is no 
feeling of want."9 In Plato, the search for knowledge is based on 
a natural desire for a lost condition. It can be justified by escha to- 
logical reasons but not grounded in intellectually heteronomous 
needs. The search for knowledge remains a value in itself. 
Given Plato's and Aristotle's positions, it is easy to see why ex- 
plaining the search for knowledge in terms of "self-motivated" 
cultivation of a purely intellectual pleasure has been always so 
popular among philosophers. Whether we agree with Whitehead's 
famous remark on Western philosophy being a series of comments 
on Plato, or with Peirce, who believed that Western philosophy 
was simply an articulation ofAristotle's thought,10 throughout the 
history of philosophy the idea that knowledge is sought just for its 
own sake has been assumed as un-controversial. Together with the 
visual metaphors, the idea that man has a spontaneous and inborn 
desire to know just for the sake of knowledge is one of the more 
deeply rooted legacies of Greek philosophy in the history of epis- 
temology.11 
By saying that a Platonic understanding of the "desire to know" 
tends to a more radical hypostatization of such desire, I had not 
meant o say that the Aristotelian approach is free from such a rei- 
fication. Within Aristotelianism, the "desire to know" turns out to 
be interpreted as an actual driving force. So much so that in order 
to comment on Aristotle's explanation for the search for knowl- 
edge, Thomas Aquinas introduced the neologism vis cognoscitiva.12 
Like other types of vis, the vis cognoscitiva was the outcome of the 
Aristotelian subordination fthe genetic principle of the process of 
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knowing to the metaphysics of potentiality and actualization.13 The 
"physicalization" of the epistemic drive was already implicit in 
Aristotle's use of orej}oy a term that conveys the idea of a meta- 
phorical tension towards the object of the desire and thus of a 
journey of the subject towards the object of his knowledge.14 There 
is no space here to point out how this interpretation was in accor- 
dance with the Aristotelian physics both of natural and of violent 
movements, so let me just stress that, if the search for knowledge 
is a process interpretable in terms of movement towards reality, 
then - according to the Aristotelian maxim omne quod movetur ab 
alio movetur - there must be a motive power for such movement 
and this is the desire to know, a dynamic force intrinsic in man's 
nature. At the same time, if the search for knowledge is a movement 
towards something, it could be the metaphorical movement of man 
towards his natural place, represented by the enjoyment of full in- 
tellectual knowledge. It would be easy to show that the 
Neoplatonic tradition is also committed to similar dynamic meta- 
phors, where the search for knowledge is interpreted as a movement 
(this time more "vertical ascension" than a "horizontal grasping") 
towards the kingdom of a-temporal, immutable truths or a divine 
entity.15 
In his Comment on the Metaphysics, Albert the Great made explicit 
his interpretation of the nature of the "pure desire to know" by 
giving to the fourth chapter concerning Aristotle's dictum the title 
"De primo principio generativo scientiae ex parte nostra, quod est 
naturale sciendi desiderium".16 His tenet was that the human desire 
represents the subjective ratio essendi of the genesis of the process 
of knowing. In adding the indicative specification "ex parte nostra" 
("from our side") Albert the Great was probably thinking about 
the other conditio sine qua non for the production of knowledge, 
namely the presence of intelligible external reality. He would not 
take the mere presence of an external object as a necessary condi- 
tion for the activation of the process of knowing, claiming perhaps 
instead the necessity of some sort of ontic contribution as the ad- 
ditional ratio essendi of the genesis of the process of knowing. It is 
Scepticism and the Search for Knowledge 547 
precisely this presupposition of an "ontic participation 
" - however 
we may interpret it, say in terms of some activity of external reality 
on the senses (the process of informano) or as an ontic disposition 
of reality to be known by the subject - that gradually disappears 
from the horizon of modern philosophy, when the "desire to 
know" becomes a tendency that could in fact no longer be related 
to the general status of the rest of the universe. This is one of the 
two principal problems faced by the explanation of the demand for 
knowledge in terms of a spontaneous epistemic longing, and it 
stems from the Cartesian turn and the consequent introduction of 
methodological scepticism in epistemology. By saying "phusei" in 
Metaphysics I.I,908a 21, Aristotle was implying that to the human 
desire to know the world corresponded, on the ontological side, the 
intrinsically knowable nature of the world itself. The expression "by 
nature" was to be interpreted as meaning "according to the in- 
trinsic, harmonious features of an intelligible universe".17 This had 
at least two enormous consequences. First, "by nature" conveyed 
the idea that "to be a knowledge-seeker" was a property which 
went together with that of "being a human being". And secondly, 
"by nature" indicated that such a property was just the denoting 
characteristic of an element of the universe which therefore must 
be compatible with the rest of it. As Jonathan Lear has explained: 
"man is by nature a questioner of the world: he seeks to understand 
why the world is the way it is, the world for its part reciprocates: it 
"answers" man's question."18 It is because of the "phusei/ 
naturatiteli clause that Aristotle and his Medieval commentators 
could disregard the problematicity of the notion of vis cognoscitiva. 
The fundamental tenet was that "the natural desire to know cannot 
be fruitless (vanum)".19 However, the "phusci-ckusc" developed 
into the post-Cartesian "spontaneous-clause" via the Latin natu- 
ralitet20, and from Descartes onward the spontaneous desire to 
know the intrinsic nature of reality may have no correspondence on 
the ontological side. The intrinsic nature of reality may be un- 
knowable despite our spontaneous desire to know it, a dualism in- 
conceivable for an advocate of the "phusei-cfausc". Such a trans- 
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formation requires further attention. 
At the beginning of "The Search for Truth by means of the 
Natural light" Descartes wrote: 
"Polyander: [. . .] I shall regret my ignorance for the rest 
of my life if I do not learn anything through my association 
with you. 
Epistemon: The best thing I can tell you on this topic is 
that the desire for knowledge, which is common to all men, 
is an illness which cannot be cured, for curiosity grows with 
learning. [...]. 
Eudoxus [i.e. Descartes]: Is it possible, Epistemon, that 
you, with all your learning are persuaded that nature can 
contain a malady so universal without also providing a 
remedy for it? For my part, just as I think that each land 
has enough fruits and rivers to satisfy the hunger and thirst 
of all its inhabitants, so too I think that enough truth can 
be known in each subject to satisfy amply the curiosity of 
orderly souls."21 
The parallel between the desire to know and hunger, and how 
nature has provided all the means to satisfy both of them fully, is 
only a ploy adopted by Descartes in order to introduce the cogito 
as a means of justifying knowledge by internal criteria of clarity and 
certainty, that is as "the food" which will satisfy any "epistemo- 
logically hungry soul". But the purpose and the development of this 
introduction is not what interests us here. The central point is that 
this short passage shows what Descartes' attitude towards the desire 
to know was. The epistemic inclination of the knower must be 
supposed to go together with the possibility of knowing external 
reality. Although Descartes meant to save the harmony between the 
two elements, it is indicative that in the dialogue we encounter the 
possibility of a more problematic relation between the epistemic 
desire and the possibility of fulfilling it. It is as if Descartes was 
pondering the possibility of assuming the desire to know without 
the metaphysical implication of an intrinsically intelligible world and 
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in the end dedded not to accept the independence of the former 
from the natural tendency of the latter to satisfy it. We know that 
more generally Descartes hesitates on the edge of his dualism be- 
tween ordo rerum and ordo idearum but still resolves it by means 
of an appeal to God, who will not deceive us. As in the Scholastic 
tradition, it is God who ensures that the desire to know is satisfiable 
by the nature of external reality. And yet, Descartes prepares the 
field for the bankrupting of what has been called afterwards the 
anthropocentric conception of the universe. Although not yet in 
Descartes himself, it is with Descartes that the Traumatic Doubt 
begins to appear as the vital challenge for modern epistemology. 
As Ernst Cassirer has put it: tt[in Descartes] Reason, as the system 
of clear and distinct ideas, and the world, as the totality of created 
being, can nowhere foil to harmonize; for they merely represent 
different versions or different expressions of the same essence. The 
'archetypal intellect' of God thus becomes the bond between 
thinking and being, between truth and reality in the philosophy of 
Descartes. [. . .] In the development beyond Descartes all imme- 
diate connection between reality and the human mind, between 
thinking substance and extended substance is denied and com- 
pletely broken off. There is no union between soul and body, be- 
tween our ideas and reality, except that which is given or produced 
by the being of God."22 When the "theological glue" melts under 
the light of the "Enlightenment", the dualism between vis cognos- 
citiva and knowability of external reality is carried to its extreme 
consequences.23 Thus, although the modern epistemological dual- 
ism is characterized as Cartesian, insofar as the relation between 
desire to know and intelligibility of the world is concerned, 
Descartes is still echoing the Classic tradition, especially Aristotle. 
What makes Descartes' position different from those classic and 
medieval is that his harmony between knower and known is as- 
sumed a posteriori, is first challenged and then critically accepted as 
problematic. It makes all the difference to assume that there is a 
strict harmony between desire to know and intelligibility of the 
universe because there is no real distinction between the two - 
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because there is not even a clear distinction, let alone an opposition, 
between subject and object - and to say that on the one side there 
isa vis cognoscitiva that moves the human knowing subject, that on 
the other side there is a world which is the target of that vis and to 
say further that in the middle there is a harmoniser God who con- 
ciliates the former with the latter and vice versa, granting the pos- 
sibility of knowledge. This second position, obtained after the ap- 
plication of the methodological doubt, has in itself its own end. It 
implies an internal tension which will split the harmonic monism 
into a dualism between knowledge and reality, the reality as we take 
it and the reality as it is in itself. 
No wonder then that Descartes is the main polemic reference of 
a Neoscholastic author like Jacques Maritain: "With this theory of 
representational ideas the claims of Cartesian reason to indepen- 
dence of external objects reach their highest point: thought breaks 
with Being. [. . .] Here again Kant finishes Descartes> work. If the 
intelligence when it thinks, reaches immediately only its own 
thought, or its representations, the thing hidden behind these rep- 
resentations remains for ever unknowable."24 Descartes eventually 
opens the way to the Kantian dualism between reality in itself and 
phenomenal reality, thereby frustrating the desire to know how 
things really are in themselves. All through the modern age the 
process will be slow but continuous. Precisely the force which has 
brought epistemology to the level of philosophia prima, viz. the 
methodological doubt, will also determine, through radical Humian 
scepticism, the end of the harmonious tate between vis cognoscitiva 
and intelligibility of external reality. When, with Kant, epistemology 
gives up any attempt to defend the full knowability of noumena, the 
harmony between vis cognoscitiva and the full intelligibility of nature 
finally collapses. In Kant, the desire to know remains a human 
tendency towards an impossible knowledge of noumenal reality. 
After a tradition of more than two thousand years in which man has 
been supposed to be a satisfiable knowledge-seeker, Kant is forced 
to reinterpret the desire to know the intrinsic nature of external 
reality no longer in terms of an ontologically justified desire for 
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knowledge but epistemologically, in terms of a regulative use of the 
ideas of reason. Such a shift opens a completely different chapter in 
the history of philosophy.25 As Sloterdijk has colourfully summar- 
ized: aat the end of the great will to knowledge there is of necessity 
always 'theoretical despair'. The thinker's heart burns when he re- 
alizes that we cannot know what we 'really' want to know. Faust is 
basically a desperate Kantian who tries to escape the compulsion to 
self-limitation through a magical backdoor. The urge to go beyond 
the limit remains stronger than the insight into the limitedness of 
our knowledge."26 
Lacking the reassuring assumption of a world intelligible in itself 
and which collaborates with the epistemic enterprise, the vis cog- 
noscitiva ends by contributing to the formulation of the Traumatic 
Doubt: "it is only because the world offers a course along which 
man's inquiries can run that his desire to know has any hope of 
being satisfied. [. . .] Imagine how frustrating it would be to be 
born with the desire to understand in a world which did not 
cooperate!"27 
The second kind of problem faced by the assumption of the 
vis cognoscitiva is much older, being recognized by Aristotle 
himself, and concerns our ordinary evidence. Generally speaking, 
the majority of men do not seem to be overpreoccupied with the 
search for knowledge, or at least not as much as the assumption 
of a common vis cognoscitiva would make us believe. The postu- 
late requires elaborate explanations of why, despite their vis cog- 
noscitiva, most men actually do not search for knowledge. 
Echoing both Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, Boethius of Dacia 
summarized the problem thus: "although all men naturally desire 
to know, yet very few of them, and this is a pity, dedicate 
themselves to the search for wisdom [highest standard of knowl- 
edge], all the others being prevented from such a great good by 
their disordered desires".28 His position was not new. In antiquity 
Galen had already expressed his own doubts about a longing for 
the truth which very few exhibited.29 Centuries later Locke ex- 
pressed a not very different opinion: "There is no body in the 
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Commonwealth of Learning, who does not profess himself a lover 
of Truth: and there is not a rational Creature that would not take 
it amiss to be thought otherwise of. And yet for all this one may 
truly say, there are very few lovers of Truth for Truth's sake, even 
amongst those who persuade themselves that they are so. How 
a Man may know whether he be so in earnest is worth enquiry 
[. . .]\30 It is not necessary to articulate further these problems 
in order to understand how deeply they tend to undermine the 
validity of the notion of vis cognoscitiva. The explanation of the 
search for knowledge in terms of a natural desire turns out to be 
too intellectualist. 
3. The Aristotelian Postulate 
I have dwelled on some significant phases of the development of 
the notion of vis cognoscitiva and it is now necessary to explain 
more precisely what philosophers mean by this "desire to know". 
There are three possible ways of understanding the expression, and 
only the third seems to be philosophically relevant. 
First, the desire for knowledge can be understood biologically, 
as animal instinctive interest in knowledge, i.e. as a vital interest 
in a certain amount of empirical information ecessary to survive 
in a hostile environment. However, such an instinctive interest 
in knowing goes only as far as the needs for a more secure life 
require. It can never promote pure research for the sake of 
knowledge. To give a circular example, it can never promote 
philosophical investigation. 
Second, the desire for knowledge and curiosity are often treated 
as the same psychological phenomenon.31 This may be because, 
as in Hume32, we are ascribing to curiosity the same meaning as 
to vis cognoscitiva, i.e. loosely, "pure desire to know just for the 
sake of knowledge". In this case we are still in need of a clearer 
understanding of the original notion. In other cases, it may hap- 
pen that the philosophical vis cqgniscitiva is simply confused with 
the phenomenon of psychological curiosity. The fact that in psy- 
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chology the phenomenon of curiosity is studied by means of ex- 
periments with rats indicates clearly enough that there is a dif- 
ference between this notion and that philosophical one of vis 
cognoscitiva, at least in terms of degree. 
By way of comparison with the phenomenon of psychological 
curiosity, we finally arrive at the third way of understanding the 
notion of vis cognoscitiva. Even admitting that there is no firm 
distinction between curiosity and the philosophical desire to know, 
it is certainly possible to understand the latter as a particular kind 
of curiosity. Suppose we define such a philosophical curiosity 
"epistemophilia".33 By mere curiosity we may then understand the 
superficial impulse to know novel or interesting material, in so far 
as this does not require a long, tiring, mental activity but rather 
a certain amusement. It is the kind of uncritical inquisitiveness so 
well described by Plutarch in his Magna Moralia.34 Such curiosity 
has more to do with the enjoyable, passive reception of infor- 
mation than with the active elaboration of new knowledge, al- 
though its roots can be easily connected to the biological interest 
in knowledge. On the other hand, by "epistemophilia" we may 
refer to the (alleged) phenomenon of spontaneous and inborn 
impulse to pursue knowledge for its own sake, without premedi- 
tation or reflection, independently of any other external cause and 
even despite personal, psychological and social costs or difficulties. 
This is the philosophical vis cognoscitiva. The distinction is not 
new - a similar contrast was already drawn for example by Diderot 
and D'Alambert35 - and it is worth noticing that in German it is 
even fixed lexically by means of the two different nouns Net^aier 
(curiosity) and Wissbeaier (desire to know). 
On the basis of the previous remarks we can now re-interpret 
Metaphysics I.I,908a 21 in the following post-Cartesian terms: All 
men have a spontaneous, inborn, epistemophilic impulse {vis cog- 
noscitiva) that drives them towards the acquisition of knowledge 
of the intrinsic nature of external reality just for the sake of 
knowledge itself. I shall call this the Aristotelian Postulate (hence- 
forth AP). 
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4. Towards a Pcirccish Approach 
Despite the great popularity of the AP both in its pre- and 
post-Cartesian understandings, some historical indications for the 
elaboration of an attack on the vis cognoscitiva can be found dis- 
seminated in Ancient Pyrrhonism, in Spinoza and in Locke. As 
before, the amplitude of the topic forces me to a somewhat sche- 
matic presentation. 
Ancient Pyrrhonism is the principal source for a vision of man 
who is "ethically" justified in virtue of the peace of mind enjoyed, 
unconcerned with pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. According 
to Pyrrhonism, the most natural and basic tendency of the human 
mind is towards a physical and mental tranquillity {ataraxia) , not 
towards the actualization of intellectual potentialities. 
Unfortunately, one of the principal limits of the Pyrrhonist rejection 
of the notion of vis cognoscitiva lies in the conviction that man can 
actually do without knowledge. The point can be anchored to 
Hume's conclusions contained in the Treatise.26 It is not clear why 
the elimination of epistemic certainties hould induce man into a 
state of epoche and then of tranquillity instead of one of acute anx- 
iety.37 The Pyrrhonist has to show us first that the procedure of 
putting the epistemic beliefs in mutual contrast is really effective, 
and secondly that even if it is effective and sometimes can lead a 
person to acquire her desired ataraxia,, it does it more easily, 
quickly and commonly than the process of searching for a belief 
that may convince the same person. We do not seem to be at liberty 
to live out the complete scepticism required in practice. Instead, the 
best way of attaining mental peace, the one actually followed by the 
human mind, is by means of the acquisition of strong beliefs or 
prejudices, hardly to be shaken by any counter-argument. Although 
a nescient ataraxia is the regulative goal of any human mind, this 
has to be gained by acquiring some kind of knowledge. Such ac- 
quisition of knowledge stops the painful process of investigation 
while gradually decreasing the degree of nescience still defensible, 
until the whole process reaches a homoeostatic38 equilibrium. 
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Experience told Hume that the Pyrrhonist cannot live his scepti- 
cism. We shall see that experience told Peirce that in pursuit of 
peace of mind man follows the strategy of adhering to beliefs as 
long and as strongly as possible.39 
Spinoza is the philosopher who, more than any other, developed 
the notion of conatus.40 According to his analysis, the mind is 
governed by an inertial tendency to remain in its own state. This 
should have led Spinoza to conclude that there is no such thing as 
a spontaneous interest in knowledge if it were not that, for Spinoza, 
in opposition to the Pyrrhonist tenet the initial state of the mind is 
not one of "nescient rest" but one of "active movement towards 
knowledge", so that the highest aspiration of mind's natural cog- 
nitive activity is still the fulfillment of its desire for knowing. The 
inertial conatus of the mind is applied to a state of "cognitive dy- 
namics" and it gives rise to what Spinoza calls the cupiditas cog- 
noscendi, and this despite the fact that the nature of mind is rec- 
ognized as being intrinsically conservative. 
Finally, Locke is the first epistemologist who emphasizes the role 
of uneasiness in the search for knowledge, in this way anticipating 
some aspects of Peirce's theory of doubt and belief.41 In order to 
pursue something, the recognition of that something as worthy of 
being pursued is not sufficient. In addition, what is required is a 
fundamental unease together with a need to calm it. Developing 
what we have seen is already a Platonic suggestion, Locke believes 
that from a mere descriptive point of view it is understandable that 
people may value the search for knowledge while not in fact par- 
ticipating themselves in that search. Thus, in the Essay Locke 
presents us with the anti-intellectualist idea that unless man feels 
mentally uncomfortable in his state of nescience he will persist in 
that state.42 However, far from being sympathetic to man's normal 
appreciation of his state of nescience, Locke still considers the desire 
for the acquisition of intellectual knowledge the precise duty of any 
man who can afford to study.43 If the majority of men do not see 
knowledge as a desideratum^ on ethical grounds they ought to be 
ashamed of feeling comfortable in a state of nescience and should 
556 Luciano Floridi 
still consider it a desiderandum. The AP maintains its strong ethical 
characterization and the search for knowledge is still linked to the 
original prescription implicit in the AP. There is no mention of any 
external pressure on the human mind that forces it to acquire 
knowledge, nor of any sort of search for knowledge as a reaction 
to such pressure. 
5. A Peirceish Approach 
Locke's vaguely ethical justification was grounded on a meta- 
physical vision of man which was still classic and medieval. With the 
disappearance of Greek metaphysics and scholastic theology, it 
seems that there are no longer good reasons to maintain an expla- 
nation of the search for knowledge in terms of vis cognoscitiva. If 
the AP must follow the same destiny of the philosophical contexts 
which produced it, the inversion of perspective we need to operate 
with respect to such an acritical legacy of Greek epistemology is 
more radical than the one endorsed by Locke. Our explanation of 
the genesis of knowledge must rely on a more inertial (Spinoza) and 
static (Pyrrhonism) description of the initial state of mind. 
According to the anti-AP, man is still driven by a fundamental co- 
natus, but the latter has to be interpreted as a mental tendency to 
persevere in his own state of intellectual nescience for as long as 
possible. At the beginning, there occurs a static, mental state of 
nescience which also implies at least a pleasant state of absence of 
uneasiness or anxiety, if not more positively one of full tranquillity. 
This complex state of nescient ataraxia is conservative. It entails a 
spontaneous, inborn and inertial conatus to persist in that state, 
unless some external force or pressure (lack of meaning, new 
problems, loss of certainty) compels a change. If the mind is forced 
into an unnatural state of uneasiness, the process of knowing is 
activated in order to restore as much as possible of its original state. 
This process is carried on in the most effective way, e.g. by means 
of the simple assumption of mere prejudices, or by means of the 
elaboration of scientific hypotheses. The "secretion" of further 
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knowledge is a "reaction" to the imbalance produced by a state of 
uneasiness, and its aim is the restoration of a state of mental peace 
at a higher level of homoeostatic equilibrium between pressure and 
correspondent epistemic answer. When the equilibrium is restored, 
the advancement of knowledge stops. The search for knowledge is 
reactivated whenever the external pressure increases, overcoming 
the protection the mind has already accumulated in terms of es- 
tablished knowledge. It follows that if man were left alone, deprived 
of any external compulsory force, he would immediately stop in- 
quiring just for the sake of knowledge. From the point of view of 
the anti-AP, human knowledge is a by-product of man's reaction 
against external reality. Like a pearl, despite its great beauty, it has 
to be considered the end result of a disturbance provoked by an 
external factor in the context of animal's life. The three phases in 
which the genesis of the process of knowing is understood - the 
static state, the inertial tendency and the restoration of the static 
state - give rise to a sort of endless dialectic of the search for 
knowledge according to which - and contrary to what happens if 
we accept the AP - the mind plays a reactive role, one of response. 
To external reality is left the role of initiating the whole process. 
Peirce's pragmatism provides the most favourable "environment" 
within which the anti-AP can be understood and developed. This 
is because of the particular position enjoyed by Peirce within the 
history of philosophy. The great majority of philosophers who have 
been interested in studying the nature of human knowledge have 
also been convinced, at least implicitly, of the virtues of the AP. 
Those few philosophers who have been more "sceptical" about the 
epistemophilic nature of man, have also tended to disregard epis- 
temological issues and thus are also the philosophers from whom 
we cannot expect very much by way of discussion of the AP. 
Nietzsche is a good example.44 As a consequence, we can find some 
suggestions on the nature of an anti-Aristotelian position only in 
a philosopher with a strong interest in a pragmatic, realistic, almost 
cynical understanding of intellectual knowledge. Peirce is such a 
philosopher. He shares the interest of Pyrrhonism in questioning 
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the intellectualist picture of man as spontaneously and irresistibility 
driven towards knowledge (Peirce's anti-intellectualism is of a piece 
with his anti-Cartesianism, see for example 5.264-5), while he does 
not share the same negative conception about the value of human 
knowledge and the possibilities of its realization. 
Peirce combines a strong ontological realism with a pragmatic 
interpretation of the role of knowledge. External, brute reality op- 
poses the mind and the mind employs knowledge to defend itself 
from the non-mind, or from what is dead-mind.45 Throughout 
Peirce's work we find that reality forces itself upon the human mind 
almost violently,46 and the mind is forced to acknowledge external 
reality as a hard fact.47 It is the "hardness of reality" that compels 
man to admit the existence of the world as brute force.48 The bor- 
derline where brute fact and the mind clash is the sphere of per- 
ception and experience.49 Perception represents two objects reacting 
upon one another.50 In the perceptual stage of knowledge brute 
reality enters the mind, and in having experience the mind reacts to 
perceptions.51 It is in the passage from doubt to belief that the 
mental uneasiness, brought about by experience, is contrasted. 
Although Peirce is not sure about the dynamic characterization of 
the opposition between reality and mind,32 he believes that "the 
important point [is] that the sense of externality in perception 
consists in a sense of powerlessness before the overwhelming force 
of perception. Now the only way in which any force can be learned 
is by something like trying to oppose it. That we do something like 
this is shown by the shock we receive from any unexpected experi- 
ence. It is the inertia, of mind, which tends to remain in the state in 
which it is [my italics] [. . .]."53 If the mind deals with reality by 
means of knowledge, it does so only on the basis of a "reactive 
conservatism" which contrasts that "sense of externality, of the 
presence of a non-ego, which accompanies perception."54 Thus, 
man is engaged in the process of inquiry precisely in order to erad- 
icate the feeling of doubt that is at the origin of the inquiry itself.55 
As a result, Peirce can conclude that "facts are hard things which do 
not consist in my thinking so and so, but stand unmoved by what- 
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ever you or I or any man or generations of men may opine about 
them. [. . .] I wish to reason in such way that the facts shall not, and 
cannot, disappoint the promises of my reasoning. Whether such 
reasoning is agreeable to my intellectual impulses is a matter of no sort 
of consequence, I do reason not for the sake of my delight in reasoning, 
but solely to avoid disappointment and surprise" [my italics].56 
According to this position, man searches for knowledge in order to 
settle his doubts **[. . .] and when doubt finally ceases, no matter how, 
the end of reasoning is attained [my italics]."57 If man could resolve 
never to change his existing opinions there would be no motive for 
reasoning and it would be absurd for him to do so. 
Peirce's theory of doubt and belief58 represents a theoretical 
context generally favourable to the elaboration of the anti-AP 
sketched above. But is it possible to reformulate the anti-AP as a 
"Peircean Postulate"? Although I believe that what has been said 
so far provides strong evidence in favour of the claim that the 
anti-AP is somewhat Peircean, on closer analysis it is also possible 
to ascertain a residue of an Aristotelian element in Peirce's episte- 
mology, such that its presence allows one to speak only of the 
possibility of a Peirceish Postulate. 
In "The Fixation of BelieP Peirce lists four ways of obtaining the 
cessation of doubt, the settlement of opinion and hence the ac- 
quisition of a state of mental ataraxia: tenacity, authority, a priority 
and scientific inquiry. According to Peirce, the first hree methods 
inevitably fail in the long run to keep the human mind safe from 
unwanted surprises. Only when he has reached the scientific 
method can man cope with reality in the best way. At this point, 
an aspect of Peirce's theory of knowledge turns out to be contro- 
versial, for I believe that Peirce is either too optimistic on the 
open-mindness of our human knower, or too sceptical about the 
potentialities of the three first methods, especially tenacity and au- 
thority.59 There may be two reasons why Peirce is so confident in 
the fact that tenacity and authority quickly foil to resist the test of 
life. First, the type of knowledge he has in mind is timeless 
knowledge that is, ideally speaking, the final picture of the world 
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that all human knowing subjects will agree on. So far I believe 
Peirce is right when he says that, in the long term, non-scientific 
methods will certainly be replaced by the scientific, for the simple 
reason that the latter provide the best "reaction" to reality and no 
other "defence" could be more effective against the "non-ego" 
than one obtained by means of a scientific method (why this is so 
is a metaphysical question I shall leave open in this context). Yet, 
the very fact that it is an ideal picture of the development of human 
knowledge makes his position somewhat suspect. At times Peirce 
still exhibits a residual version of the AP in describing the nature 
of the scientific investigation.60 This may be the second reason why 
he is so confident about the development of the scientific method. 
In his faith in an epistemophilic impulse (cf. his notion of Gnostic 
Instinct in 7.58), Peirce seems to oppose the idea that man could 
be ethically justified in disregarding the scientific method, and enjoy 
a happy life in this world despite his nescience. Note that, according 
to Peirce, there is no dichotomy between empirical and scientific 
knowledge, and therefore that the dialectic doubt/belief applies to 
the former as well as to the latter.61 The scientific "defence" of man 
against reality represents the best answer to genuine doubts. Yet, 
notwithstanding the homoeostatic picture of science, in the back- 
ground of Peirce's epistemology there is still a perceptible vision of 
man as spontaneously tending toward the acquisition of knowledge 
just for its own sake. Like Locke, when Peirce comes to speak of the 
nature of the scientific inquiry he can hardly resist the ethical appeal 
of the notion of epistemophilia. This explains why we find 
Aristotle's dictum "all men by nature desire to know" quoted in 
Greek and translated in English in one of his manuscripts62, in 
connection with the description of the pure desire for scientific 
knowledge for its own sake.63 
The fact that Peirce still exhibits a residual notion of the vis cog- 
noscitiva with respect to scientific knowledge casts a clear light on 
an important aspect of his thought. We know that Peirce's prag- 
matism represents a radical break from the Cartesian tradition. He 
probably reacted against the Cartesian epistemological turn also 
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because he was well aware of a more medieval image of the process 
of knowing, as a mutual relation between knowcr and known.64 In 
this sense, Peirce's pragmatism is also a break from the notion of 
a Cartesian vis cognoscitiva that is emptied of its ontological corre- 
spondence (the "phusei" clause). Although in large part Peirce does 
not simply turn back to a pre-Cartesian pproach, there are without 
any doubt medieval influences atwork in his philosophy, at least 
insofar as they provide a means to escape the Cartesian picture of 
knowledge. In re-acquiring a notion of knowledge as the result of 
an interplay between man and reality65 Peirce goes beyond 
Descartes, for his theory of doubt and belief is not a revival of 
medieval epistemology, and yet we may see that Peirce's notion of 
a Gnostic Instinct and his ethical conception of the desire for 
knowledge represent the price he had to pay for having implicitly 
used medieval philosophy in his attempt to refute Descartes' epis- 
temology. 
If I am correct, the Aristotelian residue in Peirce's theory of 
knowledge can be eliminated. Man pursues knowledge only for the 
sake of his own mental peace. Science can be considered only a 
more effective instrument to achieve such a target, all other con- 
siderations like vital needs, curiosity, social position, wealth etc., 
being equal. As Peirce himself says ahence the sole object of inquiry 
is the settlement ofopinion. We may fancy that this is not enough 
for us, and that we seek, not merely an opinion, but a true opinion. 
But put this fancy to the test, and it proves groundless; for as soon 
as a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief 
be true or false."66 We do not search for knowledge just for its own 
sake, "on the contrary, we cling tenaciously, not merely to believ- 
ing, but to believing just what we do believe".67 
According to this "purified" Peirceish perspective, a post- 
Cartesian version of the anti-AP holds that: (PP) man has a 
spontaneous, inborn and inertial, mental conatus that makes him 
persevere in his own static state of nescient ataraxia, unless he 
is compelled to change that state by some external force impressed 
upon his mind. Such a conams is the conservative force that ac- 
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uvates the search for knowledge. It makes the human mind react 
against the ontic pressure resulting from the contrasting presence 
of external reality. Its goal is the restoration of a homoeostatic, 
peaceful state of ataraxia, by means of the production of 
knowledge. 
The PP is still incomplete since the Aristotelian residue has an 
important function within Peirce's epistemology. It is the back- 
ground condition whereby Peirce can eventually disregard, as 
non-problematic, questions about the few cases in which man really 
seems to be pursuing knowledge for its own sake, e.g. in the case 
of philosophical research. By eliminating any Aristotelian residue, 
the PP feces the crucial problem of how one is to account for such 
few cases. The solution of the problem lies in the feet that the PP 
as it stands refers to the simple relation occurring between the 
human mind and reality. In this way it misses a final and important 
distinction between what may count as external reality for the hu- 
man mind in general and what may count as external reality for a 
specific human mind. In the former case, the human mind feces the 
physical world as what is not-mind or dead-mind; in the latter case, 
an individual human mind is confronted by whatever is different 
from itself, either the physical world or all the previous products 
of other human minds, including history and culture. The PP 
speaks of intellectual knowledge as a reaction of the mind against 
reality interpreting the latter in terms of the physical world, but in 
order to understand how cultural phenomena like philosophy may 
occur, we need to focus on the notion of intellectual knowledge as 
the reaction of a single mind against anything that could count as 
external and extraneous, from a desk to a painting, from a scientific 
theory to a poem, from superstitions to all the instances of knowl- 
edge stored in a library.68 The introduction of this final distinction 
covers the explanatory role that in Peirce's epistemology is played 
by the Aristotelian residue. By means of it the PP can also explain 
what it is that intellectuals, philosophers and scientists are doing 
when they seem to be pursuing knowledge for its own sake. They 
are reacting not only against the external physical world but also 
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against the external world of human mental products. According to 
this last specification, a new post-Cartesian version of the PP turns 
out to hold that: (PP*) each single mind has a spontaneous, inborn 
and inertial mental conatus that makes it persevere in its own static 
state of nescient ataraxia, unless it is compelled to change that state 
by some external force impressed upon it. Such a conatus is the 
conservative force that activates the search for knowledge. It makes 
a human mind react against the pressure resulting from the con- 
trasting presence of physical and historical realities. Its goal is the 
homoeostatic restoration of a peaceful state of ataraxia, by means 
of the production of knowledge. 
"Human kind cannot bear very much reality", including histori- 
cal reality, the kind of which he is both the maker and master. 
When there is something resembling a desire for knowledge, this is 
a sign that such empirical or historical disturbances are in action. 
Analogously, the acquisition of knowledge can be interpreted as a 
"cognitive therapy"69 against nature and history. The single mind 
searches for knowledge not for its own sake, but as relief against 
external disturbances, doubts, absurdities and lack of meaning. 
6. A Peirceish Solution of the Traumatic Doubt 
If now we replace the AP with the PP* - that is if we interpret 
the principle governing the search for knowledge in terms of the 
effect of a conservative conatus for peace of mind rather than in 
terms of the action of a desire for knowledge for its own sake - the 
doubt that "reality may be completely different from what we take 
it to be" turns out to be no longer traumatic. On the contrary, it 
may represent a possibility which the human knowing subject might 
welcome. The limits of human knowledge - that the AP interpreted 
as the walls of a prison for the mind - according to the PP* are to 
be interpreted as a defence or a protection that the mind creates in 
order to save itself from the pressure coming from the external 
world. It is not merely that it does not matter if, in establishing his 
reign over reality, man unfortunately loses the possibility of know- 
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ing its intrinsic nature. Bather, the hypothesis is that the scope of 
knowledge is that of neutralizing the object of knowledge, of 
transforming what it is in itself into something which is what it is 
only because of the mind. External reality exercises an alienating 
pressure on the human subject that would be successful if it were 
not for the cognitive reaction of the latter. Mental life becomes 
possible only if reality is subjugated and ordered by means of epis- 
temic schemes. The mind emerges only by withstanding reality and 
it does so only by interpreting it. The purpose of the process of 
knowing is therefore that of producing a dichotomy between sub- 
ject and object which allows the mind to develop itself. There may 
be more or less effective ways to cope with this task, and we may 
call the most efficacious the scientific, but the result does not 
change. It is only in the struggle for positing such a gap between 
brute facts and their interpretation that the mind emerges in its full 
connotations. By maintaining such a hiatus it manages to survive. 
The scope of the process of knowing does not lie in a mystical 
identification or confusion of the knower with the known (in a le- 
thal risk of an "ontic over-exposure" of the mind to being), but in 
letting reality intrude into the internal world as peacefully as pos- 
sible. Visually, in the development of knowledge the mind does not 
ago towards" external reality, but it is rather vice versa, so that we 
may invert he Baconian metaphor by saying that it is the mind that 
attempts a cognitive defence against the intrusion of external reality 
into its internal world, not nature that has to defend itself against 
the scientific aggression of the human mind. 
If we find this hypothesis acceptable, we may also discover some 
irony in what I called the Traumatic Doubt. If the purpose of the 
process of knowing is that of re-establishing mental tranquillity, the 
fact that in this process the intrinsic nature of external reality may 
remain forever undiscovered is no longer a traumatic hypothesis. 
According to the PP*, seeing a human knowing subject as being 
tormented by the doubt that reality in itself may be completely 
different from what he takes it to be is equivalent to misunder- 
standing the purpose of the search for knowledge. Let me clarify 
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the point farther by answering two possible critiques. 
First objection: the assumption of the PP* does not solve the real 
issue that is at stake in advancing the doubt that reality in itself may 
be completely different from what we take it to be. For, if only 
implicitly, such a doubt is in fact the possibility that in the future 
reality may turn out to be completely different from what I take it 
to be now. It would be this Goodman's paradox that actually rep- 
resents the traumatic aspect of the doubt. 
Answer: as I premised at the outset of this paper, I am assuming 
that the Traumatic Doubt I am discussing is not due to a pre- 
epistemological, methodological challenge à la Descartes, but is 
actually the one provoked by a Kantian-like distinction between 
Din¿ ** nch ̂d reality as we know it, which in turn results from 
an interpretation of knowledge in terms of the transcendental 
conditions that constitute the world for what it is. This is why I said 
above "if the doubt is understood in Kantian terms". If the doubt 
is stating that phenomena are different from noumenal reality be- 
cause they are noumenal reality which has undergone an inescapa- 
ble mental elaboration, then the constancy of the nature of the 
phenomena is also linked to the constancy of their transcendental 
elaboration, and what I am wondering is not whether what is blue 
now will be green tomorrow, but whether what is blue now is now 
intrinsically blue or not. In other words, what I am wondering is 
whether what is now blue and may turn out to be green in the 
future in fact has such an intrinsic nature, that of changing colour 
after some time. Thus, I acknowledge that if the doubt were of a 
different nature it is possible that the assumption of the PP* would 
be insufficient for its solution. In fact, the assumption of the PP* 
as a sufficient device for the "dissolution" of the problematic aspect 
of the doubt presupposes a Kantian reading of the doubt, while it 
also implicitly supports a Kantian analysis of knowledge of reality 
as being determined also by the mental, i.e. it implicitly supports 
the possibility of interpreting knowledge transcendentally, as a 
manipulation of a noumenal input, the possibility of which is re- 
siding in the mental. 
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Second objection: by hypothesizing a desire for a homoeostatic 
mental tranquillity the PP* is incapable of explaining the fact that 
the human search for knowledge is never-ending. If we assume that 
the individual mind dedicates itself to activities other than the 
search for knowledge as soon as it can, this seems to vitiate the 
possibility of explaining the development of knowledge. 
Answer: according to the PP* the boundaries of human knowl- 
edge are always advancing because of the endless dialectic between 
reactive conservatism and desire for a mental peace free of pressure, 
both ontological and cultural. In the course of the process of ap- 
propriation of the right protection against reality, some individuals 
may respond to new problems arising both from the natural and 
from the historical-cultural environment. The fact that man keeps 
on trying to settle his doubts once and for all leads to the pro- 
duction of new knowledge, which in turn creates the condition for 
further eaction and production. Past knowledge "solidifies", be- 
coming part of the external world, and future minds have to react, 
too, against the previous "reactions" by producing new knowledge, 
which in turn will represent another piece of external reality for the 
still future minds. Human minds are forced to keep the defending 
process in action also because of the pressure of the same armour 
built by previous minds. Only on this dialectic described by the PP* 
can there be a proper understanding of "cultural tradition". Thus, 
in a developed culture a philosopher can reach such a point of 
forgetfulness as to believe that the wall of knowledge between the 
mind and reality is a prison for the former, not a defence against the 
latter. In a cognitively protected environment the pressure coming 
from external reality can decrease to such an extent as to induce 
some people to believe that the search for knowledge is a pleasure 
pursued by every man just for the sake of knowledge. But according 
to the PP* the original search for knowledge is not to be misin- 
terpreted as an enjoyment. It is rather the outcome of the individ- 
ual's onerous duty to conquer his or her own mental freedom by 
defending him or herself both against reality and against human 
cultural acquiescence. Locke was right both in being tolerant with 
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men who arc not interested in acquiring knowledge for its own sake 
and in praising those who seek it. He was only wrong in explaining 
the origin of the latter in the necessity of a free, epistemophilic 
impulse instead of a rational duty of a Kantian character. Thomas 
Jefferson wrote as follows a[. . .] the diffusion of knowledge among 
the people. No other sure foundation can be devised, for the 
preservation of freedom and happiness";70 I would like to add now 
that if man were moved by the spontaneous and pure desire to 
develop and diffuse knowledge it would not be necessary to remind 
him not to place obstacles to inquiry.71 
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